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1.1 Mounting criticism 
The spectacular failure of Carillion has brought into focus again the problematic 
relationship between public and private sectors in the management of punishment.  
As one of the largest suppliers of services to the public sector, including prisons and 
hospitals, Carillion employed 20,000 people in the UK. It had been awarded 
contracts worth over £200 million for facilities management services to maintain 
public sector prisons but went into liquidation with huge debts. The contracts 
Carillion made between December 2016 and July 2017 were investigated by the 
Financial Services Authority. Following its collapse, the Ministry of Justice launched a 
new government-owned facilities management company, announced in January 
2018, to take over cleaning, maintenance, landscaping and planned building repair 
work in 52 prison establishments.1   
 
However, there have also been recent company insolvencies and critical reports in 
relation to the latest extension of the privatization of punishment - that involving the 
sweeping changes to probation services as part of the ‘Transforming Rehabilitation’ 
policy initiative (see Ministry of Justice 2010 and 2013). Twenty-one Community 
Rehabilitation Companies (CRCs) and a single National Probation Service (NPS) had 
replaced the previous 35 Probation Trusts in 2014, becoming operational in 2015.  
However, the Justice Secretary, David Gauke, made the following announcement on 
May 16th 2019:  
‘I am today setting out plans that will see responsibility for the management 
of all offenders transferred to the national probation service. … I believe that 
bringing responsibility for the delivery of all offender management within the 
NPS will remove some of the complexities that have caused challenges in the 
current model of delivery’ (Hansard HC Vol 660 col 401). 
 
This is in response not only to a recent consultation (Ministry of Justice 2019) but 
also to a catalogue of damning reports which included the inquiry into the 
rehabilitation programme in 2017 which focused, inter alia, on the steps taken by 
the Government to ensure an effective division between the NPS and CRCs in the 
delivery of probation services.2  The House of Commons Public Accounts Committee 
(2018) and the House of Commons Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs 
Committee (2018) also criticized the performance of the CRCs. In July 2018 David 
Gauke announced that the contracts of the eight private firms running the 21 CRCs 
would end two years early in 20203 and issued a Consultation document (Ministry of 
Justice 2018). The estimated cost to the government and taxpayer of those changes 
is £170m.4 Then, in its Progress Review of Transforming Rehabilitation, the National 
Audit Office (2019) published an extremely critical assessment of the performance of 
the CRCs against a range of objectives. It noted their under-investment in probation 
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services and the ineffectiveness of Through the Gate services. It also found little 
evidence of innovation and concluded that ‘Transforming Rehabilitation has 
achieved poor value for money for the taxpayer’ (2019: 10). Moreover by ending the 
contracts early further substantial costs have been incurred. It anticipated that ‘the 
Ministry (of Justice) will pay at least £467 million more than was required under the 
original contracts’ (2019: 10). 
 
The Probation Inspectorate has also been critical. The report of the outgoing Chief 
Inspector, Dame Glenys Stacey, described the current system as ‘irredeemably 
flawed’ (HM Inspectorate of Probation 2019b: 20). She argued that ‘the probation 
profession has been diminished and the skilled work that professionals can deliver 
has been devalued. The quality of probation work has suffered’ (2019b: 16) and 
concluded that ‘it is incredibly difficult, if not impossible, to reduce the probation 
service to a set of contractual requirements and measures... Significant flaws in the 
system have become increasingly apparent’ (2019b: 93).  
 
In addition to critical reports the providers of rehabilitation services have had 
financial difficulties. In March 2019 Interserve, the largest provider of probation and 
rehabilitation services in England and Wales, went into administration and, although 
the administrators have sold the assets to a new company, its situation has 
highlighted the risks of relying on the private sector to provide essential public 
services, especially as, a month earlier Working Links, owned by Aurelius, also went 
into administration. That company which operated, inter alia, the Dorset, Devon and 
Cornwall CRC, had been criticised for wrongly classifying offenders as low-risk in 
order to meet their targets (HMIP 2019a). The Probation Inspectorate also found 
that sentence plans at that CRC had been completed in some cases without staff 
meeting the offender, that most of the work of the company was inadequate and of 
poor quality, and that insufficient meaningful work was being completed. Rather 
efforts were focused on reducing the risk of financial penalties and some staff were 
burdened with very high workloads. It also found ‘professional ethics compromised 
and immutable lines crossed because of business imperatives’ (HMIP 2019a:4).  
 
1.2. Revisiting (part) privatization  
There have, then, been many challenges to the underlying policy assumption that 
there are instrumental benefits to the privatization of punishment:  cheaper or 
higher quality services, more opportunity for innovation and for motivating effective 
changes.  That is not to say that debate in the past has been reduced solely to the 
pragmatic issue of whether the market can ‘run’ punishment more cheaply and 
‘better’ than can public services. Ideology is also an issue given that adherence to a 
private market economy is itself based on a particular political standpoint. So what is 
again at stake in the context of failures like Carillion and critiques from Parliamentary 
reports is not just the viability of outsourcing but the assumption that the market is 
the best underpinning of public and private life and whether it is appropriate for the 
market to supply services which arguably lie within the essential functions of the 




It is therefore, timely to use England and Wales as a case study of the likely effects of 
privatising key aspects of the criminal justice system.  Based largely on an analysis of 
this evidence, with academic comment where relevant, this paper assesses the 
extent to which the instrumental aims of (part) privatization are being met. It will 
concentrate on the two main issues: the economic benefits - cost effectiveness - and 
the transformative effect – the raising of standards or the introduction of innovative 
methods.    
 
In our discussion of these intended utilitarian benefits we will focus on the two main 
objectives of (decreased) expenditure and (increased) quality. However, because 
there are slightly different angles when these objectives are applied to custodial and 
community punishment we will deal with the two forms of punishment separately.  
We will then focus on the more fundamental issue of whether, as a matter of 
principle, reliance on the market should be pursued or whether the state should take 
full responsibility for punishment. This will be explored by considering the 
implications of privatization for human rights and legitimacy.  
 
In our discussion we will take the view that, whilst the State still technically ‘runs’ 
punishment, in that it is responsible for contracts and some oversight, what in 
practice happens is that vast swathes of the penal justice estate have remained 
under the control of private, usually commercial, companies.  However, as many 
prisons remain fully within the public sector and the National Probation Service 
currently retains responsibility for high risk offenders, decides how offenders are 
allocated and, when the changes to the NPS take place, will have a wider remit, the 
situation in England and Wales has been described as part privatization or semi-
privatization.  
 
It will be argued that, whilst regulatory mechanisms are in place for the state to 
oversee this part privatization process, these are currently ineffective, and delivery 
of punishment is inadequate.   Notwithstanding the proposed changes to the NPS, 
we will argue that there are still structural issues relating to the nature of contracting 
out services which will continue under the proposed new probation system and that 
difficulties within the prison estate remain. We will also focus specifically on England 
and Wales.  As Daems and Vander Beken (2018) have noted, privatization has gone 
much further here than in other European societies and is more extensive. In France, 
for example, ‘the monopoly of the legitimate use of force lies still in the hands of the 
state’ (ibid: 3).  
 
2. The stated benefits of prison privatization 
2.1. Context 
The legislative policy background to prison privatization in England and Wales was 
the 1991 Criminal Justice Act (ss 80–88) which empowered the government to 
contract with private companies to build and run prisons and provide prisoner escort 
4 
 
services whilst the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 gave similar powers for 
Scotland (s112). As a result some prisons formerly in the public sector have been 
privatized and most of the new prisons constructed over the past 10 years have been 
private ones.5  However, the argument that privatized services are a more cost 
effective way of administering punishment was made long before the 1980s.  
 
Bentham, in the early nineteenth century, was in favour of prisons operating on a 
for-profit basis and envisaged contract management of his Panopticon penitentiary 
(see Semple 1993).  More recently, in relation to prisons, privatization has also been 
advocated as the solution to the lack of accommodation for the expanding prison 
population on the basis that competition for contracts encourages higher standards 
at a lower cost, in contrast to what was seen as an inefficient state monopoly. This 
ties in with the belief that private prison regimes can be innovative with more 
effective rehabilitation.  Politically, prison privatization has also been seen as a way 
of weakening trade union power.  
 
2.2 Cost effectiveness 
The much broader issue of the use of private funding of ‘state’ undertakings has 
come under academic critique. Senior academics in accountancy and finance have 
outlined the shortcomings of a variety of Public Private Partnerships (PPPs) and 
Private Finance Initiatives (PFIs) and concluded that using private finance for public 
infrastructure is expensive and can lead to public problems (Academy of Social 
Sciences 2018: 1-2). One process by which this can occur is that free competition can 
lead to a monopoly if the company winning the initial contract comes to dominate 
the industry, partly because they acquire experience and expertise to lower costs, 
but also because potential bidders assume existing providers are more likely to win 
the contract. It is harder for companies with no previous experience in criminal 
justice to formulate successful bids for contracts.   
 
The prediction of the emergence of only a small number of companies operating 
punishment has been fulfilled in relation to both prisons and CRCs.   In England and 
Wales the market is currently dominated by three companies - G4S, Serco and 
Sodexo, which all operate world-wide in the supply of punishment services. Similarly, 
in the USA a small number of companies run privatized prisons with CoreCivic 
(previously Corrections Corporation of America) and Geo Group dominating the 
market.6 If this trend continues then the likelihood of competition lowering costs 
diminishes.  
 
Nevertheless, it is difficult to draw clear conclusions in regard to cost effectiveness as 
there is conflicting evidence on costs and there are methodological problems in 
comparing like with like. For example, the older public sector prisons are more 
expensive to run.7  Meaningful comparisons may be difficult to make if the two 
sectors are dealing with different types of prisoner. In the US and  England and 
Wales private prisons have been used for those convicted of less serious offences so 
costs will be lower whilst in probation private companies have dealt with lower risk 
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offenders. But even if cost savings are found, if this is a result of cost cutting with 
implications for prison standards, this is clearly not desirable.  The latest available 
figures from the Ministry of Justice, released in October 2018, show cost per place 
was £24,656 and cost per prisoner was £23,089 for public sector prisons for the 
2017-18 period (Ministry of Justice 2018). The comparable figures for PFI contracted 
prisons (prisons designed, contracted and managed by the private sector) were 
£41,607 per place and £35,939 per prisoner in the same period. The figures for 
prisons operated and managed by the private sector, where the prison is leased to 
the private sector, were £19,141 per place and £15,624 per prisoner (ibid). 
 
2.3 Quality  
If the contracting company’s duty to its shareholders to increase profits means that 
lower wages are paid and less experienced staff are hired, the duty of care to, and 
control of, prisoners could be downgraded. It would appear that this imperative to 
cut costs has indeed affected quality. The Chair of the Prison Governors Association, 
Andrea Albutt, has argued that the privatization of maintenance contracts - with 
inadequate or delayed cleaning and repair of prison premises - has exacerbated the 
problems of poor prison conditions (James 2018).  Further evidence comes from the 
fact that the state took over the management of a private prison from G4S following 
a dramatic decline in prison standards. 
 
The impact of staff cuts is also acknowledged in the White Paper, Prison Safety and 
Reform, which commits the Government to additional staff recruitment (Ministry of 
Justice 2016) but states that the higher turnover of staff in private prisons than 
public sector prisons and the lower staff-inmate ratio in private prisons, the use of 
less experienced staff, lower pay and worse working conditions need addressing (HM 
Inspectorate of Prisons 2017, HM Chief Inspector of Prisons 2018).  Walker and 
Tizard (2018), in a discussion paper published by the Smith Institute, also note that 
‘Outsourcing has failed to live up to promises about “transformation”, competition 
and cost; the market is often a cartel’ (2018: 7). It has also meant that staff are often 
paid low wages or offered zero hours contracts. 
 
Cost and quality can become entangled: a focus on cost can affect the choice of what 
is offered, for example in relation to education courses. Suppliers might focus on 
courses with high numbers and good results, resulting in the withdrawal of more 
challenging higher level and less popular courses. If payment is linked to course 
completion and exam results this may lead to a reduction in the range of courses 
offered with a concentration on short basic skills courses rather than higher level 
courses (see the Coates Report 2018).  
 
The enforcement of contracts is also problematic. Whilst greater administrative and 
inspection resources would improve the situation, some of the problems arise from 
the very use of contracts to regulate behaviour. For example, contracts may contain 
penalty clauses imposing fines for poor performance but this process can take time 
so that, for instance, prisoners are subjected to problems of inadequate standards 
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during that period. Also, if contracts run for as long as 15 or even 25 years, the 
cumbersome nature of the cancellation and new tendering processes, and the costs 
it incurs, provides a disincentive for the government to cancel a contract. This 
problem extends beyond imprisonment. Some local authorities have been cancelling 
contracted out services, even if to do so imposes additional costs, because they are 
not working well and are too inflexible and inefficient, while others cannot extricate 
themselves because of the financial penalties (Walker and Tizard 2018).  
 
Assessing standards is, however, difficult because in England and Wales state sector 
prisons often house the more challenging prisoners and include some of the worst 
physical conditions in the older establishments. Furthermore it is difficult to test 
claims regarding the impact of the different prison regimes on recidivism, as 
prisoners may be transferred from public to private sector prisons during their time 
in custody.   The earlier studies of privately managed prisons found examples of high 
standards in the private sector, but also in some of the newer public sector prisons 
and Liebling et al (2011) have found examples of good practice in both sectors 
though in the private sector they found problems of weakness in control, 
organization and opportunities for prisoners to change. They also found that 
variations in quality were higher in the private sector, with prisons run by the same 
company displaying highest and lowest levels of quality. Where performance was 
poor it was linked to issues including high staff turnover, inexperience, and low cost, 
while high performance was linked to the accumulation of experience by staff.  
 
The authors acknowledge that there are problems of inefficiency in the private 
sector ‘but there are also some strengths which are in danger of being lost’ (Liebling 
et al 2011: 57).  Recent prison performance tables show a similar lack of uniformity 
with private and public prisons at both higher and lower levels (HMPPS 2017:3) and 
a report from HMIP (2017) highlighted problems of overcrowding, squalid living 
conditions and too much time spent locked up because of staff shortages. Whilst 
these reports provides no clear picture what is evident is that problems are not 
resolved by the fact that prisons are run for profit. Ludlow’s comment, on the basis 
of research on the privatization of HMP Birmingham in 2011 that ‘competition does 
not work as the British Government thinks or hopes or as neo-liberalism would 
suggest’ (Ludlow 2014: 3), would appear to be valid. 
 
Privatization has also not led to less disorder in prisons. A report recently highlighted 
the increase in assaults, self harm and the persistence of drug problems which 
exacerbated violence during 2017-18 (HMPPS 2018) and it is not unreasonable to 
assume that the tendency to lower running costs has made prisons vulnerable when 
dealing with incidents of disorder. As staff costs constitute the major cost in 
operating prisons, cutting staff can reduce costs and enhance profits which does 
then expose existing staff to greater risk as there are fewer staff to control large 
numbers of prisoners.  Doncaster and Dovegate, both operated by Serco, and 
Northumberland, operated by Sodexo, were noted by NOMS as requiring 
improvement (NOMS 2016:14). A Rectification Notice was issued to HMP Doncaster 
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in August 2015 in relation to levels of violence and staffing levels and there were also 
concerns at the performance in HMP Dovegate where there had been an escape in 
May 2015 (NOMS 2016:14) although the Report highlighted improved delivery at 
HMP Altcourse during the year.   
 
The most serious riot since the Strangeways riot in 1990, was in December 2016 at 
HMP Birmingham, managed by G4S, where rioting persisted for 12 hours, and there 
was also a serious incident there in September 2017 when prisoners flooded their 
cells.  Following the urgent notification of HMP Birmingham in August 2018, the   
Ministry of Justice took over the running of Birmingham from G4S, initially for six 
months but made permanent in April 2019.8  There are other examples of instability 
in the private sector.  HMP Northumberland, taken over by Sodexo Justice Services 
in December 2013, has seen a series of disturbances, assaults and bullying as well as 
staff reductions. Concerns over the level of violence and threats to staff have been 
raised by the Prison Officers’ Association and these concerns were expressed in a 
day of protest in 2016 over the lack of safety for staff and prisoners in the context of 
increasing violence and disorder and widespread drug use, and by further staff 
protests in 2018. 
 
A further issue is the lack of training in suicide and self harm prevention, which is 
highlighted by the case of Sean Plumstead who killed himself in HMP Winchester in 
September 2016. He had previously discussed methods of suicide with a staff 
member supervising his work but the supervisor did not report this conversation.  
The supervisor, who worked for Carillion, had received no training on suicide or self-
harm prevention. This lack of training was criticised by the Coroner of Central 
Hampshire in his prevention of future deaths report.9 
 
3. Community Rehabilitation Companies, the NPS and the market 
 
3.1. ‘Strengthening Probation, Building Confidence’ 
The revised Consultation Response and the announcement of the Justice Secretary 
that responsibility for the management of all offenders will be transferred to the 
national probation service means that CRCs will cease to exist after the intended 
extension of contracts to 2021. However part privatization of services will continue.   
‘Each NPS region will continue to have a private or voluntary sector partner—
an innovation partner—directly responsible for providing unpaid work and 
accredited programmes. The NPS will be expressly required to buy all 
interventions from the market, spending up to an estimated £280 million a 
year. Contracts will be designed flexibly, so that innovative approaches that 
show results can be quickly identified and spread across the wider system’ 
(Hansard HC Vol 660 col 401).   
Further, there is ‘no intention of reverting to the former probation trust model’ (ibid 
col 402). Eleven new probation directors will commission services and ‘will make 
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decisions based on commercial considerations in terms of the nature of the bids’ 
(ibid col 405). 
 
Whilst we welcome these changes, it is clear that an understanding of the difficulties 
that have arisen in providing rehabilitation programmes is still essential to inform 
future practice. Contractual outsourcing will continue and, arguably, the practical 
problems will not be solved by the proposed greater partnership and oversight.  
 
3.2. Recent changes  
A report from the House of Commons Public Accounts Committee pointed out that 
‘the case volumes of CRCs are much lower, by between 6% and 36%, than the 
Ministry of Justice (the Ministry) had predicted when letting the contracts’ and 
NOMS ‘attributed this, in part, to the changing nature of the offender caseload and 
the mix of cases that have come to be managed by both the National Probation 
Service (NPS) and by the CRCs’ (2016: para 8). The number of offenders referred to 
the NPS has been higher than anticipated,  as more serious offences are coming 
before the courts, whilst the courts are imposing fewer accredited programmes for  
non-custodial sentences for which CRCs receive more payments (House of Commons 
Public Accounts Committee 2018:  para 3). The Public Accounts Committee had also 
received evidence from the Howard League for Penal Reform, highlighting concerns 
over the decline in CRC funding for women’s services’ (2016: para 11).  
 
Secondly, in England and Wales the operation of the NPS and the CRCs is relevant to 
all custodial as well as non-custodial sentences.10  A rule change in 2015 for 
sentences of under 2 years means that for such prisoners the period on release is a 
mixture of being on licence and supervision.  A prisoner serving a determinate 
sentence is normally released automatically half way through the sentence whilst 
prisoners on certain sentences, including those which are 4 years or longer, may also 
apply for parole. Because an electronic monitoring (EM) requirement can be added 
to licence and supervision requirements it is also relevant to our discussion as EM 
has been contracted to the private sector since its introduction in the late 1980s11 
and we will refer to that briefly.  
 
Thirdly, it may be even more difficult to compare costs for private and public 
probation services accurately than it has been for prison privatization. The CRCs in 
England and Wales have been given low and medium risk prisoners while the NPS 
retains high risk prisoners12  (which here means the risk that if the offender is 
reconvicted it is probable the offence will be one of serious harm: see NOMS 2016)13 
and so costs will vary.  
 
The 2019 report from the House of Commons Public Accounts Committee on 
Transforming Rehabilitation set out the objectives of the 2014 changes:  ‘The 
reforms were intended to reduce reoffending, delivering net economic benefits to 
society of £10.4 billion, and introduce innovative ways of rehabilitating offenders’ 





3.4 Cost effectiveness  
There is some evidence that the new CRCs put profit before safe or effective staffing 
levels.  Sodexo was planning large scale redundancies in the spring of 2016.14 The 
Independent reported a similar employment issue in Wales:  ‘The troubled part-
privatization of the probation service has taken another hit with one new owner, 
Working Links, planning hundreds of redundancies across the country’.15  However, 
despite the implementation of redundancies,16 CRCs may still not be commercially 
sustainable. In October 2016 Plimmer reported in an article in the Financial Times 
headed ‘Let them fail’ that most of the contracts had made a loss. The review by the 
Inspectorate of Probation in 2017 also noted that delays in implementing new IT 
systems as well as financial pressures had impeded the performance of CRCs  (HMIP 
2017: 11). There have also been concerns over the expertise of the CRCs as some 
CRCs appear to have little experience of offender rehabilitation.17 
 
All these issues are pertinent to the commissioning of services by the new NPS 
directors as is the fact that the rehabilitation market has been captured by a small 
group of companies. Twenty-one contracts were awarded to eight Community 
Rehabilitation Companies in December 2014 and fourteen of the contracts to 21 
CRCs were won by three organizations: Sodexo Justice Services (a NACRO/Sodexo 
partnership) 6 contracts, Purple Futures (Interserve) 5, and Working Links 3 
contracts. This not only weakens arguments about the utility of the market to reduce 
costs but also points up the structural weaknesses inherent in contracting. Larger 
companies are better placed to absorb the costs in bidding for and negotiating 
contracts.  
 
Further, many of the firms contracted to run prisons and CRCs are multi-national 
companies and, as Burke and Collett note, ‘The globalization of services that were 
once seen as the responsibility of the state to deliver show little regard for the local’ 
(2016: 131).  Smaller providers have indeed been squeezed out as noted by the 
House of Commons Public Accounts Committee in 2018: ‘Overall, the extent of 
involvement of the third sector in delivering probations services has been woeful’ 
(2018: para 3). One reason this involvement has declined is because statutory 
supervision has now been extended to those sentenced for less than 12 months. In 
the past these offenders would have received support from charities and other third 
sector organizations but this support is now part of government probation 
supervision. It will be interesting to see whether the following government intention 
has more success in involving smaller and local providers, given the fact that NPS 
directors must make, as noted above, take ‘commercial considerations’ into account: 
‘We will look to build local arrangements that give criminal justice and local partners 
a direct role in commissioning services together with the NPS’ (Ministry of Justice 




In relation to electronic monitoring there has been evidence of overcharging by 
private companies for many years. G4S and Serco overcharged, during the period of 
the contract awarded in 2005, for electronic tags on offenders who were no longer 
being supervised on release from custody but were dead, back in prison or had left 
the country. The Ministry of Justice was billed for 3,000 more offenders a day than 
were actually being monitored: SERCO agreed to repay over £70 million and G4S 
£109 million (National Audit Office 2013, Hucklesbury and Holdsworth 2016). What 
happened next shows the difficulties the government faces in finding replacement 
contractors at short notice when few companies have the relevant expertise to 
compete. The two companies were banned from bidding for contracts in 2013 but 
the ban was lifted the next year and, despite an investigation into these companies 
by the Serious Fraud Office, G4S was given a further contract for Electronic 
Monitoring in 2017 (see also Ford 2015).  
 
3.5  Quality of Rehabilitation services 
Neither, it would seem, does the use of contracts ensure better performance. As the 
recent Ministry of Justice Paper noted, ‘Through introducing a payment by results 
performance mechanism, the reforms aimed to create new incentives for providers 
to focus on achieving reductions in reoffending in order to help tackle the 
reoffending rate’ (2019: para 4). Such a method of payment inevitably leads to a 
focus on targets rather than, for example, the quality of services, and yet the Public 
Accounts Committee in 2018 noted that 19 of the CRCs had not met their targets for 
reducing the frequency of reoffending and it was questionable whether they would 
be able to deliver the benefits promised before the contracts were due to expire.  It 
stressed that the Ministry of Justice needs to ensure they improve the quality of 
their services and fulfill promises of innovation (HC Public Accounts Committee 
2018: 3). The performance of CRCs against their contracts is described by the 
Committee as woeful and, ‘on average, only 8 of 24 targets have been achieved’ 
(2018: para 5). This is despite the additional funding given.  The contribution of the 
CRCs to ‘through the gate’ (TTG) resettlement services has also been criticised 
(Criminal Justice Joint Inspection 2017; National Audit Office 2019: 7). 
 
The House of Commons Public Accounts Committee in 2018 recommended that the 
Ministry  of Justice should review the way CRCs were  paid for their work to create 
stronger incentives for them to provide innovative services and to  reduce 
reoffending.  However, the Committee also noted that the volumes of work 
remunerated under the contracts had dramatically reduced, meaning that CRCs have 
not invested in probation services. The quality of rehabilitation services has suffered 
as a result and is undermining the objectives of the reforms (House of Commons 
Public Accounts Committee 2018: 3). 
 
It would also seem that the sanction for not fulfilling contractual terms - the fine - is 
difficult to impose or enforce. The Ministry of Justice identified financial penalties - 
with a value of £7.7 million - for the poor performance of CRCs but it has imposed 
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only £2 million of this sum. It is also owed £9 million of taxpayers’ money by the 
CRCs from overpayments (2018: para 18).  
 
Privatization of rehabilitation was also based on the assumption that the voluntary 
as well as the private sectors would bring new thinking to bear on rehabilitation 
practice but it would appear that the anticipated benefits of encouraging Third 
Sector involvement in rehabilitation have not sufficiently materialised despite that 
fact that since 2010 the Coalition and Conservative Governments had driven forward 
a policy of greater involvement of the voluntary sector. The Ministry of Justice 
awarded the Association of Chief Executives of Voluntary Organizations (ACEVO) a 
£150,000 grant - part of a total £500,000 to deliver skills workshops to support 
voluntary sector organizations (VSOs) in delivering rehabilitation services.  
Consequently, as Third Sector noted, 16 VSOs were named in the successful 
partnerships for prime contracts and about 75 per cent of the 300 subcontractors 
included in the winning bids were not-for-profits (Third Sector 2015). This is all in line 
with longstanding ideas on the role of the state and charitable effort within a 
modern capitalist society (Deakin 1995, Lewis 1999, Ministry of Justice 2013, 
Tomczak 2017b).   
 
Until recently the extent of involvement by VSOs has been unclear partly because 
‘the work of voluntary organizations has gone “largely unnoticed” by scholars’ 
(Tomczak 2017a: 152; see also Tomczak 2016) but recent statistics show they are not 
as involved as much as they had hoped (see Clinks, NCVO and TSRC 2015: 3).  The 
National Audit Office records that just 11% (159) of VSOs working in the criminal 
justice sector were providing services directly to CRCs’ (National Audit Office 2019: 
7). Crucially, the recent report from the Chief Inspector of Probation concludes that 
it will  be impossible to  address these the problems ‘if most probation supervision 
continues to be provided by different organisations, under contract’ (HM 
Inspectorate of Probation 2019b: 17).  
 
However, the Justice Secretary has stated  that ‘we will develop a more clearly 
defined role for the private and voluntary sector in delivering core interventions to 
offenders and securing innovation in the provision of those services” (David Gauke, 
Hansard HC Vol 660 col 401). Time will tell whether this is possible within the 
anticipated structures but the evidence from CRC providers suggests not.  
 
 
4. The key role of the state in providing punishment 
 
4.1. Is outsourcing consistent with the established justifications of punishment?  
We have highlighted above - with reference to empirical evidence where available - 
the weaknesses of the instrumental arguments supporting the privatization of 
punishment. The market has failed to deliver effective or innovative regimes and the 
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voluntary sector has struggled to participate effectively. The state has been obliged 
to intervene to support private companies’ profitability and compensate for market 
failures, for example, in relation to the running of prisons and prison maintenance 
services and it is planning a major reorganisation of the NPS. It is, therefore, 
increasingly difficult to sustain a pragmatic commitment to outsourcing.   
This means that the ideological and moral arguments for and against privatization or 
part privatization are again crucial and it is appropriate to reconsider whether  it is 
appropriate that the state is providing punishment at arm’s length  and, specifically, 
whether it is consistent with established justifications of punishment.18  These 
concerns that punishment should remain the province of the state were raised at the 
time of the introduction of privatized prisons, as Genders (2002) notes, but have 
increasingly been supplanted by concerns over cost effectiveness. 
It is true that the state has not always had a monopoly over punishment. ‘In the 
1790s contract was the ordinary method of administration over a range of public 
services’ and transportation to America as well as the prison hulks had been 
managed by contractors (Semple 1993: 135). In Australia in the late eighteenth and 
early nineteenth century, transported prisoners were assigned to free settlers to use 
as a source of profit, a measure which was expanded in the 1820s and 1830s to 
become the major form of employment.19   
 
Nevertheless, the medieval notion of ‘The King’s Peace’ makes clear the long-
standing importance of centralised power in the context of punishment: ‘The 
guarantee of “law and order” ... was thus, from the beginning, a key feature of 
sovereign power’ (Garland 2001: 29).  When democratic power increased in the 
nineteenth and twentieth century, this sovereign power ‘was transformed into a 
“public” power’ (ibid: 30). In the course of the nineteenth century the principle that 
the central government should run prisons and organise punishment generally 
became so established that, in 1922, the Webbs expressed their contempt at the 
idea of ‘converting the keeping of a prison into a profit-making private business’ 
(S&B Webb 1922: 18 in Semple 1993: 134).   
 
A focus on the special nature of punishment - as opposed to other forms of public 
‘services’ which do not involve deprivation of liberty or resources – raises, then, the 
key question of whether the delivery of punishment should be outsourced to a 
private company.  The punishment by the state  of the citizen  who has violated 
norms  is essential to the social contract between state and  citizens, but is it right 
that a third party should take over that role?  If, say, a fast food company won a 
contract would it have the same weight and authority as the Queen or the State? It is 
also open to question whether a company with experience of a very different 
industry to prison should be expected to move successfully into a new area.  Sodexo, 
for example, which began as the Société d’Exploitation Hôtelière, describes itself as 
‘The world's largest contract food service provider with operations in more than 65 




A sense of shared responsibility and accountability is, arguably, much less likely with 
a fragmented provision of punishment which the state manages at arms’ length. 
McNeill takes the argument further:   
‘Rather, my fear is that by transforming rehabilitation from being a moral 
good into a market good, something central to justice will be lost. … When 
we seek to sell off our mutual obligations to one another, we weaken the 
moral bonds between us, because we treat as merely instrumental things 
that are in fact constitutive of “the good society”. Rehabilitation is one such 
good; it is a duty that citizens owe to one another.’ (McNeill 2013: 85).  
Such obligations cannot, therefore, simply be sold to third parties without affecting 
our notions of justice and society as well.  This is a crucial argument because it brings 
into play all our ideas of what constitutes justice and fairness. It brings into play the 
long standing penological arguments founded in retributivist and utilitarian 
justifications.   
On desert theory, the imposition of proportionate punishment by the state on those 
who are culpable, is a precondition of just punishment. The moral foundations of 
punishment rest on the principles of proportionality and desert and should not be 
influenced by extraneous factors, such as cost savings or crime reduction strategies. 
The role of the state is crucial in meting out punishment: for classical retributivists 
such as Kant (1796-7) and Hegel (1832), crime is not simply a harm done to another 
individual, but rather a crime against society and, therefore, it is essential that 
punishment is the responsibility of the state, rather than that of the victim or other 
third party. If the debt the offender owes is to society and the state, outsourcing this 
process to a private company undermines the key relation between state and citizen.  
Modern retributivists view punishment as censure or public reproof and the state 
gives expression to this in imposing punishment.  So von Hirsch’s (1976) restatement 
of desert theory in Doing Justice posits the aim of the penal system as to do justice 
rather than to maximise benefits and cut costs. Censure is a moral judgement 
regarding the perpetrator’s actions and communicates to him or her social 
disapproval of the crime. Outsourcing the administration of punishment then, 
arguably, undermines the close relationship between the state and the offender.  
For utilitarian theory punishment is justified in terms of what benefits society as a 
whole (Bentham 1789). Resources should, therefore, be targeted efficiently and so 
this approach might appear more sympathetic to outsourcing. However for 
utilitarianism, the key issue is cost effectiveness and, as we have seen, it is difficult to 
sustain the case for the benefits of outsourcing especially at the current time where 
public funds have been used to prop up ailing private companies.   
The purported advantage of there being more innovative techniques in outsourced 
custodial or community punishment has also been questioned.  Gates et al (1998) in 
their review of available research found no empirical studies showing innovation in 
the private sector (see also Shichor 1995).  The cost pressures mean that few 
resources may be available to experiment with new approaches. The Probation 
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Inspectorate found some examples of innovative work but concluded that the 
operating model undermined evidence-based probation practice (HM Inspectorate 
of Probation 2019b: 55). It reported that no new rehabilitation programmes had 
been submitted for accreditation by a CRC and  that while  Transforming 
Rehabilitation was intended  to encourage innovation, ‘CRC contracts do not reward 
innovation or continuous improvement’ (ibid: 87).  
Moreover, there is an inherent conflict of interest at the heart of the commercial 
enterprise. Private companies have a vested interest in the expansion of punishment 
to boost profitability and the demand for their services. In the US funding was given 
by private correction companies to the American Legislative Council, which lobbied 
for harsher sentencing laws (Dolovich 2005: 526). Of course judgments regarding the 
appropriate sentence are made outside the penal system and sentencers work 
within the constraints of sentencing law and guidelines.  But the time served may 
also depend on parole decisions and outcomes of disciplinary hearings for infractions 
of prison rules, in which the reports of officers within privately run prisons about 
inmates’ behaviour may be relevant to outcomes. While many factors influence 
penal expansion and contraction, linking punishment to profit increases this risk.  
In the next section we take forward our arguments to establish that the state has a 
unique role in relation to punishment by focusing on legitimacy and accountability.  
4.2 The legitimacy of the transfer of the right to punish to the private sector 
For punishment to be legitimate - whether based on retributivist or utilitarian 
principles - it needs to be seen as fair and acceptable by citizens, including the 
recipients of punishment.  Within liberal democratic societies this means that the 
state should acknowledge the rights of prisoners not to be subject to inhuman and 
degrading treatment or punishment and also not to be subjected to excessive 
punishment. These are the values which citizens would see as just if they designed a 
system of punishment in ignorance of their position – whether as perpetrators or 
victims of crime (Rawls 1971).  While both public and private prisons may sometimes 
fail in meeting these standards, it is arguable that the risk of failure is greater when 
punishment is outsourced and profit becomes a factor in the supply of services.   
In the context of probation, as McNeill (2013) argues, building trust with offenders is 
essential to legitimacy, but marketisation may undermine this relationship: ‘A 
pecuniary contract preoccupied with targets that generate financial rewards is not a 
recipe for trust and engagement; it is a recipe for service users feeling and being 
objectified as a potential income source – or, worse, as a waste of time and effort’ 
(McNeill 2013: 84). 
Even though the state is ultimately responsible for contracting and inspecting the 
services supplied, because of the nature of the duties entailed in confining inmates, 
such as body and cell searches, legitimacy is crucial. But as Buckhardt (2014) and 
Fitzgibbon and Lea (2017) have noted, the issue of legitimacy has been marginalised 
by advocates of privatization who have focused on the cost reductions and other 
benefits of private prisons. 
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Legitimacy is also connected to accountability.  On one level there is accountability 
for privatised prisons and services. Prisons in the private sector are subject to 
regulation by the state and specifically, the Ministry of Justice, and Ministers are 
accountable to Parliament whilst the operation of privatized services is subject to 
review by the National Audit Office. All prisons are governed by the Prison Act, 
Prison Rules and other relevant legislation and prisoners are protected by the same 
mechanisms as in public sector prisons, including human rights law, the Prisons and 
Probation Ombudsman and the UK’s National Preventive Mechanism.  Controllers 
within the contracted-out prisons also monitor the operation of the contract and are 
accountable to the Secretary of State for Justice.  However, this does not go far 
enough even though contracts are also used to hold companies accountable to 
public standards of imprisonment (Gran and Henry 2007-08) because relying on the 
contract to protect prisoners from inhuman treatment may be problematic.  
Inevitably the terms of the contract cannot cover every situation and the 
administration of punishment affords officers a high level of discretion. Nor can we 
rely on litigation to guarantee protection of prisoners.  In the UK and the US the 
courts have frequently deferred to the administrative requirements of the prison 
when asked to address issues of prison conditions (see, Dolovich 2005, Easton 2011). 
While the Strasbourg Court has been more willing to engage in a hands-on approach, 
the qualifications within the key Articles of the Convention and the margin of 
appreciation afforded to states may undermine the prospects of enforcement. The 
Legal Aid, Sentencing and the Punishment of Offenders Act in 2012 has also limited 
access to aid for prisoners’ claims in the UK as has the Prison Litigation Reform Act 
1995 in the USA.20  For monitoring to be effective considerable resources need to be 
invested into it.   Moreover, as noted above, competition for contracts has been of 
limited value in raising standards whilst, for states concerned over performance, 
ending the contract may incur both financial penalties and practical problems, as 
seen in relation to the electronic monitoring scandal. Further, as the state becomes 
more reliant on the private sector a rapid response to problems becomes more 
difficult.  
One might argue that the legitimacy of the state encouraging privatization of other 
services, such as gas or electricity, depends on consumer choice. However, the 
prisoner clearly has no way of exercising choice to use an alternative and is not 
involved in decisions to award or terminate the contract. Moreover performance of 
staff is not linked to approval by users of the service in the case of prisons.   
Prisoners cannot enforce the contract themselves and even where the courts have 
found breaches of prisoners’ rights they have not always awarded compensation. In 
some cases a declaration of incompatibility has been seen as just satisfaction, for 
example in relation to  voting rights, in Firth and Others  v UK App Nos. 47784/09 and  
47806/09 (12 August 2014). The Prison Inspectorate does not offer direct 
compensation for breaches even where the urgent notification procedure is used. So 
services users are in quite a different position to consumers of other privatized 
services. Furthermore, contracts endure for much longer periods than for utilities, 
where consumers can switch services to another supplier without difficulty.    
4.3. Lessons from an Israeli case 
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The opinion in a landmark case in the Israeli Supreme Court, Academic Center of Law 
and Business v Minister of Finance HCJ 2605/05 (19 November 2009), is useful in 
delineating the unique role of the state in the administration of punishment and the 
problems in abdicating that role. This case is particularly relevant to the 
consideration of privatization in England and Wales as the intended approach was 
based on the English model of regulation in which supervision is carried out by state 
inspectors inside the private prison, but the issues it raises have a wider resonance.  
Here the Israeli Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of the Prisons 
Ordinance Amendment law (No. 28) 5764-2004, which provided that the state 
would, for the first time, establish a prison operated by a private corporation. The 
court stressed that when we imprison a citizen, this restraint on liberty - itself a 
rights violation - is justified only to protect the public interest, but if the party 
denying liberty is motivated by a private interest, then there is an additional 
violation of liberty. The public purpose justifying imprisonment, which gives 
imprisonment its legitimacy, is thereby undermined (see also Dilulio 1988). 
Amendment 28 would give a private concessionaire powers which, when exercised, 
necessarily entail serious violations of human rights to personal liberty and human 
dignity,  including powers to maintain order, discipline and public security, to 
prevent escapes, to examine a prisoner’s body, to take bodily samples and to keep a 
prisoner in isolation for a limited time.   In this respect the administration of 
punishment is unlike all other privatized activities. The Court noted that the prison ‘is 
the institution in which the most serious violations of human rights that a modern 
democratic state may impose on its subject may and do occur’ (at 68). While 
prisoners are inevitably deprived of their right to liberty, this violation is justified 
only to protect the public interest, namely to meet the goals of punishment, 
deterrence, retribution and rehabilitation. 
 
Reference was made by President Beinisch to the social contract theorists, Locke and 
Hobbes, who stressed that we surrender power to the state to enforce the social 
contract in order to achieve personal security and social order. The use of force by a 
body other than the state would lack legitimacy and constitute an improper and 
arbitrary use of violence. When the power to withhold liberty is transferred to a 
third party, the legitimacy of the punishment of imprisonment is undermined 
because ‘the sanction is enforced by a party that is motivated first and foremost by 
economic considerations – considerations that are irrelevant to the realization of the 
purposes of the sentence, which are public purposes’ (ibid at 69). The private 
corporation’s interests are essentially private interests not public interests. 
Moreover, treating inmates as a source of profit entails a lack of respect for their 
status as human beings. This violation of human dignity does not depend on their 
treatment in prison, but is inherent in the transfer. 
 
 So the legitimacy of this power to punish is lost by transferring it to a private 
corporation.  Whether or not any financial benefits accrue from the transfer does 
not alter this. The aim of the Amendment to save public money was outweighed by 
the rights violations and if saving were needed they could be achieved by other 
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means.  Irrespective of any benefit from privatization it is   the actual transfer of 
powers from the state to the private company – a profit-making enterprise  which  
‘causes a serious and grave violation of the inmates’ basic human rights to personal 
liberty and human dignity’(at 58). 
 
6. Conclusion 
What the above judgment makes very clear is that the rights violation does not 
depend on the actual treatment of the prisoner, but is built into the transfer. 
Similarly, we argue, in community punishment the transfer to the private sector risks 
diminishing the public’s sense of the legitimacy and morality of the punishment. 
Burke and Collett, for example, have pointed to the potential impact of the fact that, 
unlike probation officers, those working in CRCs  - or, in the future, the 
commissioned services - are not officers of the court (2016: 129). Dominey also 
argues that this affects the status of community sentences as their legitimacy for 
supervisors and supervisees in part ‘stemmed from the relationship between the 
probation supervisor and the sentencing court’ (Dominey 2016: 138).  Furthermore, 
as Dorfman and Harel point out (2016: 440), privatization transforms ‘our political 
system and public culture from ones characterised by robust shared responsibility 
and political engagement to ones characterised by fragmentation and sectarianism’.  
 
The experience of privatization of punishment does, therefore, raise a number of 
issues in relation not only to our accepted justifications for punishment but also 
problems of accountability, efficiency, legitimacy and human rights. And the 
increased costs to the taxpayer of outsourcing contracts because of company 
bankruptcies now makes it harder to maintain the cost effectiveness argument.  It is 
also clear that if the public sector is given sufficient resources it is equally able to 
supply effective punishment services.  
 
We consider the arguments for ending or reducing privatization of penal services are 
compelling but if, for political reasons,21 outsourcing of punishment is to continue 
despite these problems, what is required at the very least is a contracting process 
which does not encourage rehabilitation programmes and prison management 
which are ‘cheap’ at the expense of innovation, longer term stability, professionalism 
and recruitment and retention of sufficient high quality staff. We also need greater 
parliamentary scrutiny of contracts, a change in contract terms so that locally based 
and national charities are better able to take a controlling role in providing 
community punishment, and a more robust response to failures to deliver 
contractual terms.  
 Furthermore, it would be unhelpful if privatization continued to be viewed as a 
panacea for the enduring problems facing the criminal justice system, especially in 
view of the current prevailing instability. As Dolovich notes ‘If the penal system is 
failing, changing the logo on the letterhead or the nameplates on the doors will not 
solve existing problems’ (Dolovich 2005: 514). Focusing on a simple comparison 
between public and private does not address deeper issues facing prisons and nor 
does it deal with the problems arising from the current model of probation.  We fear 
18 
 
that the new model of probation will also face problems.  Rory Stewart, the former 
prisons and probation minister, has said that ‘it is clear the current model is not 
working’ (see Grierson, 2019) and the Justice Secretary has stated there are 
‘challenges’ in the current system. His proposals for change are at least in part a 
response to demands for a re-unified probation service which have increasingly been 
raised by groups working with offenders.22  We would support a fundamental re-
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